Introduction
The main understanding of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (EU) is that there is no role for a supranational institution in this policy field.
However, by opting for a redefinition of the European defence procurement policy from intergovernmental to supranational, the Defence and Security Procurement Directive
The dominant explanation of compliance in EU implementation (compliance) literature is that it is subject to the enforcement role of the Commission (Tallberg 1999; Treib 2014) . Based on the powers attributed to the Commission (Article 258 TFEU), this paper first examines whether the member states calculated the risk of sanctions when revising their offset policy 1 in light of a specific Guidance Note addressing this policy.
Challenging such an expectation, previous research findings on the role of the Commission in the field of defence procurement emphasize how, for example, the UK believed the Commission's bark to be worse than its bite (Strikwerda 2017) . A cost benefit analysis is therefore deemed insufficient to explain why member states complied.
Other perspectives might complement the explanation of the member state actors assessing risk. For example, since implementation is the responsibility of civil servants, they may have felt an obligation to follow rules that eventually led to changes in the national offset policy.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, recent studies addressing offset policy change have focused on the Commission, finding that the Commission is an opportunistic enforcer (Weiss and Blauberger 2016) , but the member states are not systematically studied. We therefore know what the Commission did, and why. However, after examining the actions of the member state actors we may have to change our assumptions of why member states complied. These assumptions lead in to the second contribution, since the dominant mechanism in the implementation literature, analytically speaking, is coercion. Yet this particular explanation seems insufficient in this case. This paper seeks to fill this analytical gap by applying an alternative explanation, which allows for the examination of the mechanism of rule following by actors (civil servants) in the implementation phase.
The following section discusses the transposition of the Defence Directive and the status of the Guidance Notes. The third section presents an analytical framework before the empirical data from the Netherlands, Finland and the UK are analysed. The final section of this paper discusses the implications of the findings.
The European Commission and implementation guidance
The formal role of the Commission in the transposition of EU Directives is the monitoring and enforcement of implementation and compliance (Tallberg 2002; Börzel 2003) .
Hence, in practice, the Commission assists member states to achieve correct implementation and future compliance (Sverdrup 2003; Steunenberg 2010 Three examples of such a de facto change will be discussed. The main indicator of change is the recognition that offset use is only possible when justified as an essential national security interest (European Commission 2010) . In these three cases, formal government guidelines and a new policy were introduced after 2010, to steer the future use of compensation policy (see Table 1 ).
In the Netherlands, the government changed its offset policy into a new Industrial Participation policy (Tweede Kamer 2011 Tweede Kamer 2012 Eerste Kamer 2012 and published a specific Defence Industry Strategy (DIS) in 2013, based on the Commission's interpretation. The strategy contains guidelines for the national Industrial Participation policy (Rijksoverheid 2013) ; aimed at the consolidation of policy choices of what the Dutch government regards an essential national security interest (Rijksoverheid 2013) . These new documents contain policy guidelines for the circumstances in which compensation will be provided (applied).
In Finland, a special report by the Finnish ministry of Defence states that the practice of offsets has changed and the clause is no longer automatically included in defence acquisitions (Puolustusministeriö 2017 
Risk of sanctions
Studies on the implementation of and compliance with EU legislation in member states ask why the members do not comply with EU Directives or are slow in transposing directives (Batory 2016; Versluis 2004; Kaeding 2006 It is therefore likely that during the implementation process this risk was calculated by the member states. This assumption is in line with the propositions of the rational choice perspective, which assumes that actors make cost benefit calculations that drive action. Actors, in their calculations, take heed of self-interest and aim to maximize utility; the theory predicts that preferences remain fixed over time (Elster 1986) . In this case, actors in the Netherlands, Finland and the UK have arguably made strategic cost benefit calculations, in response to the future risk of a sanction (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 187; Checkel 1999: 2; Treib 2014: 11) . It can therefore be hypothesized that the UK, the Netherlands and Finland did in fact change the national offset policy, because they expected non-compliance to lead to future sanctions from the Commission.
In order to find support for this hypothesis, we need to determine whether officials in Finland, the Netherlands and the UK regard the Commission as an actor in this policy field with the potential to start infringement procedures. Second, actors are expected to emphasize the unacceptable risk of not complying. This manifestation of risk can be strengthened by finding whether the member states received what is known as a 'first warning' from the Commission during the period, or if court cases had been filed against these member states in the 2009-2013 period.
In the hands of the bureaucracy
The beginning of this paper pointed to statements by UK officials according to which threats by the Commission would not determine policy making in the field of defence procurement. That de facto offset policy did in fact change during the implementation phase can be explained by other mechanisms than the cost benefit calculations undertaken by member state officials. As the implementation of EU Directives lies mainly in the hands of the member states, it is likely that national administrations were in charge during the transposition. I draw on the logic of appropriateness to examine whether the role of these civil servants and the rules they wished to follow were a determinate factor in changing the policy de facto policy change (March and Olsen 1989) . This perspective allows me to analyse rule-based action during the implementation and examine the extent to which the mechanism can account for compliance.
The basic understanding of the logic of appropriateness is that the actions of actors are context based (March and Olsen 1989) . Consequently, actors, in (political) institutions, will follow rules and procedures due to a sense of duty (Olsen 2007) . These rules and routines create coherence and give 'clear principles of division of labour' (March and Olsen 2011) . The institutional setting and how it shapes the identity of actors in these institutions are hence seen as a separate explanatory factor (Eriksen 1999).
Rationality follows from the conviction that an action is believed to be right when it is congruent with the identity of the actor. Following these theoretical assumptions, it is likely that civil servants will seek internal consistency among rules (March and Olsen 2009: 8) .
The hypothesis following from this approach is that national offset policy was changed in the Netherlands, Finland and the UK because the Guidance Note created the necessary coherence and clarity, which echoed with the general concerns of rule consistency in the civil service. To see whether this hypothesis can explain the de facto policy change in these member states, I consider the following empirical manifestations.
First, I examine which actors dealt with the implementation process. In other words, I
may find that civil servants in the national departments of, for example, the ministries of defence were in charge of the implementation process. Second, the substance of the Guidance Note will be examined to establish whether Guidance Note created rule consistency, or to which principles or rules the note might have spoken. What I expect to find is that these national actors will confirm or deny whether they felt an obligation to follow the Commission's interpretation, based on the alignment of offset policy with existing (European) legislation or principles. Explaining the dependent variable, de facto policy change, based on a non-legally binding guidance note, can be achieved if member states can be found to have accepted the interpretation of the Commission given the high cost of non-compliance. The high cost is assumed to have been affixed to the possible risk of future sanctions. Second, in order to substantiate whether the Guidance Note created rule clarity and consistency, and civil servants had an inherent wish to follow these rules, I would expect to find that actors changed the views during the implementation process and that the Guidance Note reframed offset policy in light of existing legislation. The method applied in this paper is known as process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 14; Bennett and Checkel 2014) , allowing for the examination of the empirical data and trace mechanisms. It also allows me to determine whether the cost benefit calculation mechanism or rule following can explain the compliance with a non-legally binding guidance note.
Data and Method

Compliance with a non-legally binding guidance note
Following the analytical framework introduced above, the three cases will be analysed to identify whether concern for sanctions can explain why these member states followed a non-legally binding guidance note from the Commission during the implementation of the Defence Directive.
Based on risk avoidance?
The publication of Guidance Notes, and the involvement of the Commission during the implementation phase, was perceived by officials as an attempt on the part of the Commission to help the member states understand how the Directive should be applied By the time you talk about the interpretation of something, you have both signed on the dotted line. So all you can do at that point is do what we did, write, and say thank you very much for all the workshops and everything. We appreciate the consultation but we find ourselves disagreeing on the following points and this is why. And so it is just putting a mark to say so when we get caught we refer to this These reservations made by British officials were meant to prevent future sanctions, or were such a sanction to be levied, they would be able to refer to their reservations on certain issues: 'because our legal interpretation is not the same as theirs' (British official Whether the Commission would actually enforce the law cannot therefore be fully known.
In particular, for the UK, preferences have not changed during the implementation phase.
British officials were able to influence the interpretations of the Commission quite extensively during the implementation phase. Although their legal department has grown, officials say, they are still willing to take risks, even if it could lead to sanctions. Nor do officials seem to be convinced that the Commission will actually pursue enforcement.
The proposition that actors are driven by cost benefit calculations does not, therefore, seem to hold in this case.
Alternatively, did these actors believe it made sense to follow the Guidance Note because it created rule consistency?
In the hands of the bureaucracy?
To answer whether the implementing civil servants played a crucial role in changing the offset policy for reasons of rule consistency, this section will first discuss the actors that were in charge during the implementation process. Subsequently, the extent to which the Guidance Note addressing offsets created rule clarity and coherence will be discussed.
Finally, this section asks whether they followed the Guidance Note due to a sense of duty. This section has discussed which actors were in charge during the implementation process in order to explain why these member states complied with a non-legally binding guidance note on offsets. The process was shown to be in the hands of bureaucrats in different departments of the ministries of defence and of economic affairs in these member states. Furthermore, as the Commission's Guidance Note framed the offset policy in terms of primary EU law and the accepted Directive, civil servants were inclined to maintain rule consistency and adjusted the policy thereafter. The Commission's Guidance Notes created a form of soft law, and were considered sufficiently legitimate to follow.
The implementation of the
Concluding remarks
The European Commission was able to accomplish policy change in (at least) three member states by publishing a non-legally binding Guidance Note on offsets during the implementation process of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive. This paper finds that the enforcement powers of the Commission cannot account on their own for this change. In asking how these member states came to abolish their offset policy, the paper finds that actors changed during the implementation process. The civil servants responsible for the implementation and transposition of the Defence Directive in the Netherlands, UK and Finland aimed for rule consistency. The main reason why bureaucrats followed the Commission's advice is that the Guidance Note framed offsets in the light of existing legislation and the already accepted Directive.
What are the implications of these findings? First, the study fills a gap in the compliance literature, which has never addressed the impact of Guidance Notes on member state implementation of directives. As the implementation literature has increasingly expanded (Treib 2014 ) and enhanced our knowledge of this part of the policy process, the informal procedures by which the Commission influences this part of policy phase is less well known.
Second, through its analysis of soft measures, this study highlights the Commission's ability to change and influence the defence and security policy of the European Union. The paper therefore complements the literature on the role of the Commission in the formulation of the Common Security and Defence Policy and of studies that have addressed developments in this area. As the evidence indicates, the Commission is able to guide member states in their interpretation of the law, and member state officials consider such interpretative guidance to be appropriate; in other words, they recognize the authority of the Commission to offer advice. This is surprising, not least because in this policy field, member states are expected to be driven primarily by national interest.
Finally, analytically, the paper makes use of a well-known distinction between the logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness, finding that the former cannot fully account for the de facto national policy change. Applying the logic of appropriateness to this case study gives us an opportunity to understand, analyse and strengthen our knowledge of different mechanisms than those based on strategic interest or expected risk. The findings of this paper therefore emphasize the significance of the role of civil servants in the implementation phase, but they also reveal a need to identify the reasons why these actors considered it appropriate to follow soft measures (Eriksen 1999).
